Bi-objective network equilibrium, traffic assignment and road pricing by Wang, JYT & Ehrgott, M
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Abstract Multi-objective equilibrium models of traffic assignment state that users
of road networks travel on routes that are efficient with respect to several objectives,
such as travel time and toll. This concept provides a general framework for mod-
elling traffic flow in tolled road networks. We present the concept of time surplus
maximisation as a way of handling user preferences. Given a toll, users have a max-
imum time they are willing to spend for a trip. Time surplus is this maximum time
minus actual travel time. A rational user can be assumed to maximise time surplus,
leading to the definition of time surplus maximisation bi-objective user equilibrium.
We propose to use such models on the lower level of bi-level models for pricing in
road networks under multiple upper level objectives such as minimising total travel
time and emissions. In such a model a multi-objective optimisation problem at the
upper level is combined with a multi-objective equilibrium problem at the lower
level.
1 Traffic Assignment and User Equilibrium
Traffic assignment models the route choice of users of a road network. Given a set
of origin-destination (OD) pairs and demand for travel between these OD pairs, it
determines how many users choose each of the available routes, and thereby the
amount of traffic on each section of the road network. Conventional traffic assign-
ment is based on the assumption that all users want to minimise their travel time, or
more generally, a generalised cost function
c(xp) = m(xp)+αt(xp), (1)
where xp represents traffic flow on route p, t is travel time, which is dependent
on flow, and m is a monetary cost comprising of tolls, vehicle operating cost etc.
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that may also depend on flow and α is value of time. A user will choose the route
between their origin and destination that has the least value of c(xp).
The traffic assignment problem is based on Wardrop’s principle of user equilib-
rium [9], which can be stated as follows: Under user equilibrium conditions traffic
arranges itself in such a way that no individual trip maker can improve their gen-
eralised cost by unilaterally switching routes. In other words, at equilibrium, the
generalised cost of any used route between an OD pair must be equal and less than
that of any unused route.
It is important to note that (1) is the linear combination of two components, time
and monetary cost. In fact these are two different objective functions. Several au-
thors have recognised this and suggested bi-objective traffic assignment models, see
the references in [8]. However, these models are restrictive, by keeping the assump-
tion of the existence of an additive generalised cost (or sometimes generalised time)
function (1). Moreover, there is evidence, that users in reality do not behave ac-
cording to this assumption, see references in [8]. In [8] we have suggested a more
general bi-objective user equilibrium condition, that assumes that all users have the
two objectives of minimising travel time and minimising toll cost.
Under bi-objective user equilibrium (BUE) conditions traffic arranges itself in
such a way that no individual trip maker can improve either his/her toll or travel
time or both without worsening the other objective by unilaterally switching routes.
We have shown that, even if considering all possible values of time, i.e. α ∈
[0,∞), in (1), bi-objective models based on generalised cost provide only a subset
of all possible solutions to traffic assignment that satisfy the BUE condition. Hence
the definition of BUE provides an appropriate general framework for the study of
traffic assignment in tolled road networks.
Furthermore, in [7] we have suggested the time surplus maximisation concept
as a new route choice model that addresses the stochastic nature of route choice
behaviour and the variability among users on their willingness to pay. It is based on
the idea of time surplus. We assume that a user has in his mind a maximum time he
is willing to spend in traffic, given any level of toll. If τkp is the toll on route p for
OD pair k and the travel time is t(xkp) then the time surplus on route p for individual
i is
tsip = t
max
i
(
τkp
)
− t
(
xkp
)
. (2)
We assume that the higher the toll, the shorter the maximum time willing to spend,
i.e. we assume that tmaxi is a strictly decreasing function of τkp. This function tmaxi is
an indifference curve between time and toll for user i. The time surplus maximisa-
tion concept stipulates that all users maximise their time surplus. This gives rise to
a user equilibrium condition: Under the time surplus maximisation user equilibrium
(TSmaxBUE) condition traffic arranges itself in such a way that no individual trip
maker can increase their time surplus by unilaterally switching routes.
In order to find a solution of the TSmaxBUE problem, we employ a route-based
formulation of the equilibrium condition and follow [4] to formulate this as a non-
linear complementarity problem, which is solved by minimising an associated gap
function. Notice that because time surplus is maximised, but the NCP formulation
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requires a cost function to be minimised, we need to write this cost function as
ηkip := M− tmaxi (τkp)+ t(xkp) with a sufficiently large M in the NCP model.
2 Road Pricing
Road pricing is a common instrument to reduce congestion and has successfully
been implemented in many cities around the world, e.g. in Singapore, Stockholm
and London. The idea of congestion pricing is to charge tolls such that users are
paying the marginal social cost rather than the average private cost for their trips.
This induces changes in travel behaviour such that the total system travel time is
minimised.
In todays world the idea of sustainable transport systems is gaining importance
internationally. Sustainability encompasses the dimensions of economic, social and
environmental sustainability [2]. The European Conference of Transport Ministers
has defined a comprehensive catalogue of objectives of sustainable transport pol-
icy [3]. Among those, the objectives of creating wealth, reducing congestion, and
reducing greenhouse gas emissions are relevant for this paper, the first in terms of
economic sustainability, the second for both economic and environmental, and the
last for environmental sustainability.
We suggest that, apart from considering tolls as a means to reduce congestion,
road pricing can be an important instrument to reduce vehicle emissions. Hence the
roading authority would pursue two objectives by charging road users: To minimise
total travel time and to minimise total emissions. Road users on the other hand, will
react to the imposed tolls and attempt to minimise their own travel time and toll
cost. This framework is illustrated in Figure 1.
Fig. 1 The bilevel concept for road pricing.
At the government level there is, however, a dilemma. It is well known that tolls
that minimise total travel time do not necessarily minimise emission levels [5, 10].
Hence the problem becomes that of the determination of efficient tolls such that
neither the total travel time nor the total emissions can be reduced without worsening
the other, which is a bi-objective optimisation problem.
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3 A Bi-level Bi-objective Optimisation-Equilibrium Model
Here, we first formalise the two objective functions at government level. The first
objective function is to minimise total travel time:
minzt(x(τ)) = ∑
a∈A
xa(τ)ta(xa(τ)), (3)
where ta (xa) = t0
[
1+α
(
xa
Ca
)β]
, is a typical link travel time function [1]. Here ta
is the travel time on link a, which depends on link flow xa. Also, t0 is the free-flow
travel time and Ca the practical capacity of link a. The values of α = 0.1,β = 4.0
are typical, and we adopt them in the example of Section 4. The left plot of Figure
2 shows three examples of travel time functions used in the example of Section 4.
The second objective function is the minimisation of total CO emissions.
minze (x(τ)) = ∑
a∈A
xa(τ)ea(va(xa(τ))). (4)
Here, va is the traffic speed, which depends on link flow xa and ea is the CO emis-
sions, which in turn depends on speed, on link a. Unfortunately, there is no consen-
sus on the exact form of the emission function ea. In Figure 2 we show the functions
proposed by [10] in the middle and by [6] on the right.
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Fig. 2 Travel time (left) and CO emissions (middle and right) as functions of traffic flow.
4 A Three Link Example
We demonstrate our bilevel bi-objective-equilibrium model on a simple three link
network. The three links (or routes) connect a single origin-destination pair and have
the following characteristics. For route (link) 1, an expressway of 20 km length, we
set v0 = 100 km/h, t0 = 12 minutes, and Ca = 4,000 vehicles per hour in the function
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(3). For route (link) 2, a highway of 50 km distance these values are v0 = 100, t0 = 30
and Ca = 5,400. Finally, route (link) 3, an arterial route of 40 km length, has v0 = 60,
t0 = 40 and Ca = 4,800.
The travel time and emission functions for the three links of this network are
illustrated in Figure 2. In Figure 3 we show contour plots of the travel time and
emission functions over feasible flows together with the social optimum solutions
for travel time and emissions, illustrating that these are indeed different. We also
show the traffic flows at the untolled user equilibrium solution, and the TSmaxBUE
solution at the toll values of τ1 = 40 and τ2 = 20.
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Fig. 3 Contour plots of travel time and emissions over feasible flows.
To find the efficient tolls, we observe that we must have that the tolls are such that
τ1 > τ2 > τ3 and assume that τ3 = 0. We assume that tmax is uniformly distributed
between 10 and 25, 30 and 45, and 60 and 90 minutes on the three links, respectively.
Moreover, we allow τ1,τ2 to be in the range between 1 and 40 in discrete steps of 1.
The resulting total CO emissions versus total travel time, for both emission func-
tions, are plotted in Figure 4, clearly illustrating the tradeoff between the two ob-
jectives as well as the difference to the untolled user equilibrium solution and the
TSmaxBUE solution for τ1 = 40,τ2 = 20.
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Fig. 4 The trade-off between total travel time and total CO emissions for efficient tolls.
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5 Conclusion
In this work we have proposed a bilevel framework for road pricing to support sus-
tainable transport systems. On the upper level we consider a bi-objective optimi-
sation problem of minimising total emissions and total travel time, whereas on the
lower level we consider a bi-objective user equilibrium model with users who min-
imise their own travel time and toll cost. We have proposed the concept of time
surplus maximisation as a way of dealing with the bi-objective user equilibrium. In
future work, we will develop algorithms to solve the problem, based on the NCP
formulation of the TSmaxBUE problem and using a multi-objective evolutionary
algorithm to integrate this with the bi-objective optimisation problem on the upper
level.
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